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RULE 23: CATEGORIES OF SUBSECTION (6)
I. INTRODUCTION
Present Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) was designed to
alleviate the problems inherent in old Rule 23. 2 These problems had arisen
from the separation of class actions into three categories cast in terms of "jural
relations."3 Each category was determined by the type of right sought to be
enforced. If the right were "joint, or common, or secondary," the class action
was considered to be a "true" class action; if it were "several" and affecting
"specific property," the action was a "hybrid" class action; and if the right
to be enforced were "several" with "common questions of law or fact" and
"common relief," the class action was known as a "spurious" class action. 4
Because the terms "joint," "common" and "several" had little or no clear
meaning in the context of a class action,' categorization of a class action be-
came extremely difficult.° In addition, different consequences could result
from each classification.' For example, in a "true" class action the result was
res judicata for all members of the class; 8 however, only the members who
had actually intervened were bound by the decision in an action labeled a
"spurious" class action.°
Amended Rule 23 attempts to avoid these problems by creating effect-
orientated categories. The effect which a class action may have on interested
persons determines the category of the action. These new categories are
called, for want of a better terminology, (6) (1), (b) (2) and (b) (3) class
actions.
Even though the present Rule 23 has adopted an entirely new system of
categories, Rule 23 still contains basic prerequisites similar to those in the
old Rule. These requirements, stated in subsection (a) of Rule 23, are: (1) a
class impractical of joinder, (2) common questions of law or fact, (3) claims
or defenses which are representative of those of the whole class and (4) ade-
quate protection of the interests of the class by the representative parties."
Whether an action lies within one of the three "(b)" categories is a question
considered only after the 23(a) requirements are satisfied. Thus, even if an
action meets the prerequisites of 23 (a), in order to be a class action, it must
still meet the requirements of one of the three (b) categories. This comment
will examine the three (b) categories, and analyze the important decisions
1 Fed. IL Civ. P. 23 became effective July 1, 1966.
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C. App., at 6101 (1964).
3 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
4 Id.
5 B. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of • the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 380 (1967).
6 The courts have applied different labels to the same case. 2 W. Barron & A. Holtz-
off, Federal Practice and Procedure § 562 n.18.2. (Rules ed. 1961).
7 Id. § 562, at 262-63.
S Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
° Id.
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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dealing with each. For the purposes of discussion, the prerequisites of 23(a)
are considered fulfilled wherever necessary.
II. THE (b) (1) CATEGORY
The (b) (1) category permits class actions where the risk of certain
undesirable effects exists either for the class or for the party opposing the
class if separate actions were prosecuted. Clause (A) of 23 (b) (1) is concerned
with the effect on the opposing party and clause (B) with the effect on the
class.
Under clause (A), where a risk arises that the result of lawsuits involving
individual members of the class would be "inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions" establishing "incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class" an action is a (b) (1) class action. This risk occurs as a possibility
of inconsistent adjudications in suits brought by or aganst individual mem-
bers of the class. A municipal bond issuance serves as an example of a clause
(A) situation." Separate actions concerning the bond issue could be brought
by the taxpayers of the municipality. One taxpayer could sue to have the
bond issue declared invalid while another could sue to limit or condition
issuance of the bond. If these actions were allowed to continue separately,
the party opposing the class (the municipality) would be forced to establish
inconsistent defenses and, ultimately, could be forced into incompatible
courses of conduct. For example, the municipality may be ordered by one
court to discontinue the bond issue because it is invalid; while another court
may order the municipality to set conditions on the issuance of bonds. In
such a situation, the class action, by bringing alI the litigants into a single
forum, would be a practical and a fair means of achieving a uniform ad-
judication.
Although at first glance every situation involving separate actions by
individual members of a class appears to create risks of inconsistent adjudica-
tions, the actual hazards with which the Rule is concerned are those risks
creating incompatible standards of conduct for the opposing party. Thus,
actions for money damages would not be a clause (A) situation. Although the
opposing party may have to pay some members of the class and not other
members, this kind of incompatible conduct does not fall within the spe-
cific concern of (b) (1) (A). An example of incompatible conduct within
(b) (1) (A) occurs in a patent infringement situation where, if separate
actions are brought, the patentee might be allowed to protect his patent
from infringement from some but not from other alleged infringers.
The patent infringement and municipal bond cases could produce in-
compatible standards of conduct for the opposing party but the money
damages case does not. The reason for these seemingly contradictory results
lies in the phrase "incompatible standards of conduct." This phrase implies
that the separate judgments will affect an opposing party's continuing course
of conduct brought into issue by the suits and not that the judgments will
11 Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note].
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cause inconsistent isolated actions. In the damages example, the payment or
nonpayment of money damages are single inconsistent actions which may not
affect the party's continuing course of conduct. But in the municipal bond
example, the judgments of the invalidity of the bond issue and of limitations
on the issue will place the municipality in a dilemma as to its continuing
course of conduct with respect to the bonds. It cannot stop issuance of the
bonds yet still issue bonds with certain limitations. Thus, where separate
actions will cause the risk of inconsistent judgments establishing incompatible
standards of action for the opposing party and affecting his continuing course
of conduct, a (b) (1) (A) class action arises.
Clause (B) of 23 (b) (1) is concerned with the effect of separate actions
on the class. More specifically, clause (B) contemplates the situation where a
class has a cause of action against a party and where some members sue the
party individually in separate non-class actions with the possibility resulting
that the ability of the non-litigating members to protect their interests will be
adversely affected." By permitting a class action under these circumstances,
clause (B) protects the members not represented in the separate suits.
An example of a clause (B) situation occurs where numerous persons have
a claim against a fund insufficient to satisfy all the claims." Here the ad-
verse effect on the members not represented in the individual suits is striking.
The individual suits could exhaust the fund before all members of the class
were able to protect their interests. A class action allows the final determina-
tion of all the claims of the members of the class and subsequently the
separate proof of the amount of each claim and its pro rata share of the
fund." Thus the thrust of clause (B) is the protection of the rights of mem-
bers of a class by ensured representation through the vehicle of a class action.
A (b) (1) class action requires a risk that one of these undesirable effects
will occur. For clause (A), therefore, the possibility must exist that separate
individual actions would be brought. For example, if the alleged class is
composed of small claimants individually unable to afford the expense of
litigation, clause (A) would not apply." In such cases, separate actions would
be unlikely and consequently little danger of incompatible standards would
arise. The class action would have to be maintained under a different (b)
category. If the possibility of separate actions were not a requirement, clause
(A) would be meaningless.
However, this requirement of the possibility of separate actions should
not apply to the (b) (1) (B) category. The risk in clause (B) is that of an
adverse effect upon the interests of class members who would not be repre-
sented in individual non-class actions. The argument that, if the unrepre-
sented class members do not intend to bring suit, the court should not be
concerned that their rights may be injured, is unacceptable. The purpose
of (b) (1) (B) should not be limited to the protection of the interests of
claimants who can afford to and may bring separate suits. But (b) (1) (B)
12 Clause (B) also applies when the actions are brought against individual mem-
bers of the class.
is Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 101.
14 Id.
15 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, .564 (2d Cir. 1968).
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should also protect the interests of small claimants by permitting a class
action to represent them where an individual member's suit would adversely
affect their rights.
There has been little litigation interpreting the (b) (1) category. The
need for the possibility that other suits could be brought is the only require-
ment prescribed by the courts. 16 However, some courts have mentioned the
adverse effects which would result if the action were not permitted to proceed
as a class action." For example, in a patent infringement case, the court
stated that the weight of comity between courts and the threat of defending
expensive patent infringement suits would adversely affect the rights of
members of the class of alleged patent infringers who would not be repre-
sented in the non-class infringement suit." This same court also held that
(b) (1) (A) would apply because separate actions against individual members
would create a risk of establishment of incompatible standards of conduct
for the patentee. 19 Specifically, he may be permitted to protect his patent
from some infringers but not from others.
Perhaps the reason for so little litigation interpreting the (b) (1) cate-
gory is that (b) (1) describes a natural test for a class action. Whether in-
consistent results would create incompatible standards of conduct for the
opposing party or whether the interests of individual members would be
adversely affected by separate non-class actions may be determined easily by
the court from the nature of the relief which is sought or which may sub-
sequently be sought in other actions.
• III. THE (b)(2) CATEGORY
A (b) (2) class action exists when the requirements of 23(a) are satisfied
and when
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole.'°
This category applies when the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. This phrase
signifies that the party opposing the class does not have to act directly
against each member of the class. As long as his actions would affect all
persons similarly situated, his acts apply generally to the whole class. For
example, a refusal by an employer to hire a qualified female applicant be-
cause of her sex could be considered an act "generally applicable" to the
entire class (qualified females). Thus, through a class action the employer
16 Id.
17 Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Booth v. General
Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (ND. Ill. 1967).
18 Technograpir Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp.
714, 723 (ND. III 1968).
19 Id. at 722.
20 Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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would be enjoined from discriminating against all future, qualified female
applicants.
The (b) (2) category does not include all actions seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief. Only those actions in which "final injunctive or corre-
sponding declaratory relief" is appropriate to the class qualify for a (b) (2)
class action." A final injunction is one having the same force and effect as any
other final judgment, that is, it cannot be opened without a justifying cause. 22
Also, a permanent injunction is not necessarily a final injunction because the
former may or may not be a final judgment. If the permanent injunction is not
final, it is an interlocutory decree and may be modified or rescinded by the
court at any time before a final decree. 21 For example, where a permanent in-
junction was granted but an accounting was necessary to bring the suit to a
conclusion, the permanent injunction was considered interlocutory.24 Thus a
request for a permanent injunction may not qualify the action as a (b) (2)
action. In addition, a request for a temporary or preliminary injunction is
obviously not a request for a final injunction and would not by itself qualify
the action as a (b) (2) class action.
"Corresponding declaratory relief" means the declaration sought must
correspond to injunctive relief to qualify as a (b) (2) action. "Declaratory
relief 'corresponds' to injunctive relief when, as a practical matter, it affords
injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive relief." 25 Thus a
declaratory action to construe an obligation and to determine the existence
of a breach permitting damages would not be "corresponding declaratory
relief." The action serves as a basis for later money damages and not for
injunctive relief. On the other hand, an action contesting the constitutionality
of the taxing sections of a statute would "serve as a basis for later injunctive
relief." If the act were declared unconstitutional, injunctive relief could be
given in the event of an attempt to collect taxes.26 Also, an action to declare
defendant's patents invalid would "afford" injunctive relief. The plaintiff
could request both a declaration that the defendant's patents were invalid
and an injunction to enjoin the defendant from suing or threatening to sue
the plaintiff for patent infringement."
However, a request for other appropriate relief in addition to injunctive
or corresponding declaratory relief does not prevent the action from being a
(b) (2) class action.28 As long as the appropriate relief is not exclusively or
predominately damages, an action in which final injunctive or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate and which includes a request for the addi-
21 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
22 Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1953). See
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); Fed. R. Civ, P. 60(b).
23 Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88 (1922).
24
 Id. at 89.
25 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
2C F.G. Vogt & Sons, Inc. v. Rothensies, 11 F. Supp. 225, 231-32 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
21 United States Galvanizing & Plating Equip. Corp. v. Hanson-Van Winkle-Mun-
fling Co., 104 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1939).
28 See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F.
Supp. 714 (N.D. III. 1968).
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tional relief should qualify as a (b) (2) class action. 29 When injunctive or
declaratory relief is sought for the sole reason of meeting the requirements of
(h) (2), and when other relief predominates or is the sole appropriate relief,
the action is not a (b) (2 ) action. Since suits for injunctive and declaratory
relief are not uncommon, the courts should have little difficulty in deter-
mining whether final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief is ap-
propriate to the situation. 3°
The (b) (2) category is clearly applicable to civil rights cases and indeed
it was intended to permit class actions in the civil rights field. 3' Under the
old Rule, confusion arose as to whether civil rights cases should be considered
class actions." Because actions seeking redress for discrimination concerned
individual rights, and because a class action was to enforce the "joint,"
"common" or "several" rights of a class, courts, under the old Rule, occa-
sionally held that a class action could not be maintained because the plaintiff
had "no standing to sue for the deprivation of the civil rights of others." 33
Rule 23 has discarded the dubious terms of the old Rule and has made clear
the availability of class actions to the civil rights area. Discriminatory con-
duct against any one of a group could be considered as conduct "generally
applicable" to the entire group. Thus a representative of the class can bring
a (b) (2 ) class action seeking, for the entire class, final injunctive or corre-
sponding declaratory relief from the discriminatory behavior of the opposing
party.
Class actions under (b) ( 2) should not be limited to civil rights cases,
but should include actions to enjoin other practices, for example, price fixing
or the use of "tying" conditions. 34 The language of (b) (2 ) is sufficiently
broad to accommodate such types of grievances in addition to civil rights
actions." For example, a group of consumers charged illegal sales prices by a
price-fixing retailer could bring a class action to enjoin the retailer from selling
at the higher price." Since the excess portion of the prices could be very
small, even though trebled, in relation to the large cost of prosecuting an
antitrust suit, the threat of litigation required for a (b) (1) (A) class action
would be non-existent. However, because the action falls within the broad
20 See Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
80 But see Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968), where the circuit court, after determining the judicial review exercisable in
the case, reversed. The district court had held that final injunctive relief was inappropriate.
See id. at 937 n.42.
31 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
32 A vast majority of courts permitted the class action in desegregation cases. See
Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963) ; Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d
818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962). Contra, Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp.
539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951
(1963).
33 Brown v. Board of Trustees, 187 F.2d 20, 25 (5th Cir. 1951).
34 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
35 For an opinion which seeks to limit the application of (b)(2), see Note Pro-
posed Rule 23t Class Actions Reclassified, 51 Va. L. Rev. 629, 648-49 (1965).
36 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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language of (b) (2), a class action should be permitted especially in light of
the present trend to protect the consumer and the small claimant.
IV. THE (b)(3) CATEGORY
The (b) (3) category is slightly different from the other two (b) cate-
gories. The explicit purpose of (b) (3) is to permit a class action to "achieve
economies of time, effort and expense and promote uniformity of decision." 37
Thus, while (h)(1) is designed to prevent an undesirable effect on the
parties involved, and (b) (2) is concerned with the type of relief sought,
(b)(3) seeks to promote more immediate practical ends. Under (b)(3) the
court is required to make specific findings. These findings are that common
questions of law or fact "predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members" and that "a class action is superior" in fairness and effi-
ciency to any other form of settlement. 38
The common-questions requirement is very similar to one of the basic
23(a) prerequisites, "questions of law or fact common to the class." By this
restatement of a previous requirement in stronger terms, the drafters seem
to have created (b) (3) as a broad catch-all category." This conclusion
draws support from the likelihood of predominance in the (b)(1) and (b)(2)
categories. In (b) (2), since the concern is with the acts of the opposing
party which are generally applicable to the class and since the relief is of an
injunctive or declaratory nature, common questions should predominate. For
example, one issue under a (b) (2) action could be whether the opposing
party refused to render service because of race or religion. Whether common
questions predominate in the (b) (1) category cannot be accurately deter-
mined because (b) (1) is concerned with the effects of different suits which,
when united, may or may not contain a predominance of common issues.
Another indication that (b) (3) is designed to be a broad category is the
other requirement, superiority of the class action. If it is agreed that the
requirement of predominance is basically a reiteration of a previous require-
ment, the requirement of superiority permits a class action in diverse situa-
tions where the only limit is that the class action be a better method of
settling the controversy. In this light the (b) (3) provision fashions a broad,
residual category.
A. Purposes
Aside from the explicit purpose of promoting efficiencies of time, effort
and expense, sympathy for the small claimant seems to be one of the reasons
underlying this broad (b) (3) category. The small claimant unable to afford
litigation may not fare too well under the requirements of (b)(1), and he
may not be seeking final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief as
required by (b) (2).
Prior to the new Rule, the small claimant has always had difficulty in
litigation through the class action. Since the class action originated as an
37 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102-03.
38 Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
30 See Adviso.ry Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
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equitable device, 40
 actions which sought only damages were not included.
The original Rule 23 abolished the prohibition against class actions for
damages and established the "spurious" category. Through a spurious class
action a party could sue for himself and all others similarly situated if
common questions of law or fact were present and common relief were
sought. Although damages were permitted, the small claimant was not helped
because the spurious class action was, in effect, not a class action at all. In
order to be included in the judgment, a party had actually to intervene and
become a party to the action.'" For this reason, the spurious action served
merely as a device for "permissive joinder."42 Thus the small claimant who
could not afford to intervene was, in effect, prohibited from obtaining relief.
Some courts avoided this problem by permitting a small claimant to inter-
vene and present his individual claim for damages after defendant's liability
had been determined. 43 This "one-way intervention" procedure was subject
to much criticism since it allowed members of a class to reap the benefits of a
favorable verdict, without risking loss. 44
Category (b) (3) has alleviated the problems caused by the spurious
class action. In a (b) (3) class action, as in (b) (1) and (b) (2), all members
of the class are represented and bound by the judgment. 45 This arrangement
eliminates the need for both intervention before a final adjudication and one-
way interventions as a means of protecting the small claimant. Since the
(b) (3) class action is broader than the (b) (1) and (b) (2) categories, more
class actions will be permitted and more parties will be bound. Rule 23 makes
an allowance for this effect by permitting an individual to litigate his own
action if he requests to be excluded from the class."
While (b) (3) is able to function as a vehicle of relief for the small
claimant, its announced purpose is to "achieve economies of time, effort and
expense." This policy of efficiency exists in potential conflict with the protec-
tion desired for the small claimant. For example, in the case of a vast number
of small claimants unable to bring individual suits, it would certainly be
more "economical" to avoid the class action altogether. But (b) (3) is con-
cerned also with the "fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."'"
(Emphasis added.) Efficiency is a goal to be reconciled with, not sacrificed
to, procedural fairness. 48 Dismissal of the class action because the individual
claims are too small to be individual actions could not be considered a "fair
4° Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948); Edger-
ton v. Armour & Co., 94 F. Supp. 549, 554 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Equity R. 38, 226 U.S.
659 (1912).
41 All American Airways, Inc. v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 24S (2d Cir. 1954).
42 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Or. 1968); Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43 E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588 (10th Or.
1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962).
44 Developments in the Law—Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 874, 936 (1958); see Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 713 (1941).
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3).
4° Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
47 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
48 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102-03.
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. . . adjudication of the controversy" even though (b) (3) would "create"
litigation where none had previously existed, and, in this sense, would be "un-
fair" to the party opposing the class. Permitting a class action to adjudicate
legitimate rights cannot be considered "unfair." Nor can dismissal of the small
claimants' action be considered an "efficient adjudication of the controversy."
Prevention of expense by preclusion of the class action where the small
claimant cannot afford individual suits is neither an "adjudication" nor an
"efficient" settlement of the controversy. It is nothing more or less than the
foreclosure of small but legitimate grievances.
B. The Four Factors Pertinent to the (b) (3) Findings
In contrast to actions under (b) (1) and (b) (2), in (b) (3) the court is
specifically requested to find that the action qualifies as a (b) (3) class
action. The court must find that common questions predominate and that a
class action would be superior to other methods of resolving the controversy.
The (b) (3) category specifies four factors which are pertinent to the court's
findings. These are
•(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (I)) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action. 4°
Under factor (A), the interests of individual members of the class in
conducting or defending separate lawsuits weighs against the use of the
class action device. The word "interest" in this context should mean some-
thing more than a mere desire of certain individuals to have their own sepa-
rate lawsuits. An individual's interest should include a valid reason why he
desires to conduct a separate suit if that interest is to weigh against the
superiority of the class action. Such an interest would exist if the individual has
special issues which require separate litigation as, for example, an issue of
reliance in a case of misrepresentation. The absence of intent of individual
members to bring separate actions indicates • that they do not consider their
separate interests strong enough to justify separate suits. Furthermore, if
individuals are so poor or their claims so small that separate lawsuits are
unlikely, they will probably have little interest in suing separately.
Even though the interests of the individual is only one of the four
factors which are to be considered, a strong interest among the members in
conducting separate suits could cause a denial of the class action. The pre-
dominance of common issues and the superiority of the class action are
directly related to members' individual interests. As the issues affecting indi-
viduals increase, the desirability of conducting separate suits will also in-
crease. The result is a lack of a predominance of common issues and a
concomitant lack of superiority in the class action.
49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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Factor (B) is concerned with the individual actions already commenced.
If the nature of such actions varies, the likelihood increases that common
issues do not predominate. Thus the class action would not be superior.
Under factor (B) the court should consider especially the fairness of
making a class action out of multiple pending litigation. If the actions do
vary in nature, then one (b) (3) class action may not give the relief desired
by each individual.50 In addition, if the individual actions have proceeded
substantially toward conclusion, a new class action could well waste con-
siderable time, effort and expense. Where litigation is already in progress, the
court should consider also whether a requested exclusion from the class under
(c) (3) would permit the individual actions without destroying the usefullness
and superiority of the class action. Thus, if an individual's suit is in its final
stages, or is seeking a different form of relief, the individual may be allowed
to exclude himself from the class. The class action would then proceed with-
out effect upon the individual or his action. Of course in the absence of other
litigation factor (B) would not affect the findings since it is concerned only
with the nature and extent of litigation already commenced.
Factor (C) considers the desirability of concentrating the litigation in a
particular forum. It is relevant only to the findings of the superiority of the
class action and not to whether common issues predominate. One important
criterion of concentration must be the location of the claimants. As more of
the parties are present in the forum, concentration more effectively achieves
"economies of time, effort and expense." Other criteria typically include con-
siderations of forum shopping and of the location of the pertinent evidence
and witnesses.
Under factor (D), the court is to consider the difficulties of manage-
ment of the class action. If such difficulties are overwhelming, the class
action device would not be superior to other methods of deciding the con-
troversy. Since the judge must notify the parties who are members of the
class,5 ' if the class is so vague as to make any form of notification impossible,
the class action should be considered as being unmanageable.
Even if the problems of managing a large class suit are numerous, the
class action might still be the superior means of adjudicating the controversy.
If the individual claimants intend to prosecute separate actions, the adminis-
trative burden on the court would exceed the difficulties of managing a class
action. Thus, the court should consider the difficulties of management of the
class suit in relation to the difficulties inherent in the prosecution of separate
actions.
The Advisory Committee states that the factors (A) to (D) are not
exhaustive. 5' Making the appropriate findings under (b) (3), the court
should keep in mind the broad purposes of the (b) (3) category. Considera-
tions of fairness, efficiency and protection of the small claimant permeate
this category. In large classes involving small claimants, the attorneys' fees
50 But see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1), where the variance in each member's action
provides a basis for a class action.
51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3).
52 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 104.
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plus the cost of printing, postage and special masters' fees may be so
exorbitant as to absorb any compensation which the claimants might re-
cover. In such instances the courts should consider alternative means of
adjudication. If no other means are practicable and if the small claimants
will benefit from a determination of the opposing party's liability, the class
action should be permitted to protect their rights even though each individual
member would not recover damages.
C. The Predominance of Common Questions
To assign an action to the (b) (3) category, the court must first find
that common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting
only individual members. The presence of an abundance of issues affecting
the individual members would destroy the effectiveness of a class action.
Predominance does not mean that the common questions must be dispositive
of the entire litigation." The court must draw the line in each case and
determine when the individual questions are so overwhelming as to destroy
the utility of the class action. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23
gives the situation of a "mass accident" injuring numerous persons as an
example where common questions would not predominate. 54 In such cases,
the defendant may have committed one negligent act creating a common
question of law or fact. However, varied questions regarding each class
member are usually present, such as damages and contributory negligence.
"In these circumstances an action . . . would degenerate in practice into
multiple lawsuits separately tried." 55
Although this conclusion is reasonable for some "mass accidents" such as
a chain of automobile collisions on a foggy highway, in other mass accidents,
such as an explosion or fire in a large theatre, common questions would
predominate. The individual issues would involve only damages, and a class
action would be entirely appropriate to decide the defendant's liability. A
class action would be ideal where the defendant insists that he is not liable
and refuses to settle damages without an initial court determination of
liability. Economy would be achieved by the determination of liability in
one action and then, if necessary, separate suits for individual damages could
proceed quickly and economically. The defendant would also be protected by
the class action since he would receive his day in court and would not be
forced to settle because of the threat of numerous individual suits. 56
The courts have discussed the problem whether common questions pre-
dominate in two situations: antitrust actions and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion actions involving securities. In most antitrust cases the courts conclude
that the existence of a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws is a large
enough issue to make the class action device a desirable method of solving
the controversy. However, one court has held that the individual issues out-
58 Doigow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
54 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
55 Id.
56 For a cogent argument in support of the impracticability of using a class action
in a mass accident situation, see Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in
Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 433, 469 (1960).
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weigh the predominance of the conspiracy issue. In School Dist. v. Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc.," a school district, a state and a city were suing
publishers, distributors and wholesalers for treble damages for conspiring
to fix the prices of children's library books. The court held that the uniqueness
of the product, the method of purchase, the volume of demand and other
product-involved issues affecting individual members predominated over
issues common to all members of the class. 58
 The court seemed more
concerned with binding absent members of the class" and with the clerical
work involved in sending notice to the class membersG° than with whether a
conspiracy could be the common core for a class action.
Other cases have held that the class action is an appropriate device
where an alleged antitrust conspiracy is the common issue."' The problems
of variations in products, prices and markets were not considered sufficient
to outweigh the advantages of determination of the conspiracy question for
all members of the class in one suit.° 2
 These cases also involved large classes
whose members had to be notified and would be bound by the decision."" Also,
the problem of allocation of damages among individual claimants has not
prevented the predominance of the conspiracy issue."
Whenever the existence of the conspiracy is the common issue, the class
action should be used to resolve this part of the controversy. Without the
class action to determine liability, the small claimant would lack adequate
protection in light of the expense, length and massive evidentiary require-
ments of an antitrust suit. Thus the better view in antitrust cases is that the
issue of the existence of a conspiracy predominates and produces a common
core for a (b) (3) class action.
In the fraudulent misrepresentation actions the difficulty of determining
whether common questions predominate receives emphasis in an example
given by the Advisory Committee. The Committee notes the possibility of
material variations in the representations made to each individual and thus
potential variations in the issue of misrepresentation for members of the
class.G 5
 However, the issue of misrepresentation would not vary, for example,
5T 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
58 Id. at 1004.
5° Id. at 1005.
6° Id. at 1004-05.
61-
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Minnesota v. United
States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils,
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp.
722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
62
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Philadelphia
Elec. Co., v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Iowa v.
Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 401 (S.D. Iowa 1968) ; Seigel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
63 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (3,750,000 odd-lots
investors); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (ED. Pa.
1968) (governmental entities throughout the United States) ; Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (650 franchisees throughout the United States).
Miimesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn. 1968).
65 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
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when the misrepresentation was made in a stock prospectus. Here liability
would be an adequate subject for a (b) (3) class action and a later determi-
nation might be made for individual damages. Thus, a court should deter-
mine whether a common core of issues exists which must necessarily be
decided before the surrounding issues may be reached. This core would
provide a subject for a (b) (3) class action. For example, a (b) (3 ) class
action has been permitted where the complaint had alleged (as the core
issue) that the prospectus contained a fraudulent misrepresentation."
An equally appropriate instance for a (b) (3) class action arises where a
failure to report information concerning securities amounts to a fraudulent
withholding of information. 67 An extension of this situation arose in Esplin
v. Hirschi," where the defendants were being sued for selling the stock of
their corporation to the plaintiffs in violation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940. The trial court found
that the variations in the oral misrepresentations given to individual in-
vestors precluded a class action." Usually, oral misrepresentations in which
the contents vary among the individual members would preclude a finding of
predorninance.70 In reversing the denial of a class action, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit held that the basis of the action was the omission
of certain material facts which were withheld from all members of the class. 71
Consequently, there was a common core issue of fraudulent withholding of
information which predominated and which would determine liability with-
out involvement of individual issues. In such cases the courts have fashioned
a "common course of conduct" test to determine the presence of a pre-
dominance of common questions. Class actions alleging that the defendant
followed a common course of conduct have been permitted where the com-
plaints have alleged a series of false financial statements,72 a plan to manipu-
late stock prices" and conduct to induce fraudulently the purchase of
securities. 74
When a common course of conduct is alleged, a member's individual
reliance on the conduct is an issue which weighs against the predominance
of the common course issue. In Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc.," the de-
fendants made public statements causing the price of a stock to drop and
then bought the stock. The plaintiffs who had sold their stock at the lower
prices were suing the defendants for fraud. The court concluded that a main
issue was the reliance on these statements by members of the class and,
therefore, that questions common to members of the class did not predomi-
66 Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968).
67 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 2.59 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
418 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1194 (1969).
66 Hirschi v. B. & E. Sec., Inc., 91 F.R.D. 64 (D. Utah 1966).
7° See Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 462-63 (E.DN.Y. 1968).
71 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 98-100 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct.
1194 (1969).
72 Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
73 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (ED.N.Y. 1968).
74 Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
75 41 F.RD. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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nate.76
 However, other courts have held that questions of individual reliance
do not outweigh the predominance of the common issue of defendant's course
of conduct. 77
In Dolgow v. Anderson," stockholders sued the corporation and its
principal officers alleging a "continuous and common plan" to manipulate
the price of the stock of the corporation. The defense contended that, since
the alleged misrepresentations were disseminated to the general public in a
variety of statements, each of which were not necessarily relied upon by all
members of the class, common issues did not predominate. 79 The court found
the defendants' contention unpersuasive since the case was within the
"common course of conduct" test and the statements were made to the general
public rather than to the individuals. 83
A situation calling for denial of a class action because of the lack of a
common course of conduct arose in llioscarelli v. Stamm & Co. 61
 Customers
were suing their broker to recover damages resulting from the numerous
trades which the broker made for their account. The plaintiffs tried to qualify
the suit as a class action by claiming a common course of conduct. The claim
was that through his misrepresentations, the defendant induced members of
the class to purchase and sell an excessive amount of securities. 82
 The court
held that common questions did not predominate because recovery depended
upon a breach of the fiduciary relationship involving individual and personal
ingredients.83 To hold otherwise would have been an unfortunate over-exten-
sion of the "common course of conduct" standard. Even if the defendant
did "plan" to violate his fiduciary relationship with all his customers, unless
perhaps overt acts or statements could be found to establish independently
defendant's plan, liability depended upon proof by each individual of a
breach of the confidential relationship. The common issues did not pre-
dominate.
The common course of conduct test has resulted in two extreme situa-
tions. In Kronenberg v. Hotel (Governor) Clinton, Inc." the complaint alleged
fraud and the defendant took "great pain" to demonstrate that the alleged
false misrepresentations were so diverse that a finding of a predominance of
common questions was precluded. Without elaboration of the defendant's
course of conduct, the court simply adhered to the language of another deci-
sion and concluded flatly that the class action could be maintained because
of the common course of conduct. 88 The Kronenberg court should have re-
76 Id. at 545. This case has been considered doubtful authority by a circuit court.
Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968).
77 Weisman v. MCA Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 263 (D. Del. 1968) ; Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc.,
41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
78 43 F.R.D. 472, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
79 Id. at 488.
80 Id. at 489.
81 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
82 Id. at 461.
83 Id. at 462.
84 41 F.R.D. 42, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
85 Id. at 45.
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quested the class to allege more specifically the conduct upon which they
sought relief. If the court had knowledge of the alleged acts, the nature of
these acts should have been stated in the decision.
The Kronenberg method of proceeding should be contrasted with the
method used in Dolgow v. Anderson." A common and continuous plan to
manipulate prices was alleged. Because harmful publicity to the defendants
might result from the class action, the court required the class to present
evidence that they had a substantial possibility of prevailing on the merits
before they were allowed to proceed in a class action. 87
Neither of these two methods is desirable. The court should permit a
class action to continue where the reasonably interpreted requirements are
met," but at the same time the court should be certain that sufficient acts
are alleged to constitute a common course of conduct. In most instances no
great harm will result if a class action is permitted to proceed and is later
amended to a non-class action. However, the time, effort and expense of
preparation of the class action and the inconvenience to the class members
should preclude hastily reached decisions concerning the predominance of
common questions of law or fact.
D. The Superiority of the Class Action
Even if common questions of law or fact do predominate, the court must
still find that a class action is superior to other available methods of settling
the controversy. If an alternate procedure offers a more expeditious dis-
position of the suit, the request for a class action should be denied. Alterna-
tives to a class action would include joinder, consolidation, intervention, a
test case, and resort to the administrative agencies."
The decision whether joinder is superior to a class action should not be
difficult in practice. Joinder unites two or more persons as coplaintiffs or as
codefendants in one suit.°° A fundamental difference between joinder and a
class action is the number of people actually bound by the decision. In
joinder, only those who are litigants are bound, whereas in a class action all
members of the class, whether litigants or not, are bound. Moreover, one
prerequisite for a class action is that "the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable."° 1
 Thus, if joinder is feasible, not only is the
class action not superior, but one of the prerequisites of a class action is
unfulfilled.
Consolidation occurs when separate actions are pending before the court
and the court orders a joint trial or hearing on common questions.° 2 Thus, if
individuals have pending actions in different courts, the actions could not be
consolidated into one action. More important, consolidation is a practical
88 43 F.R.D. 472 (ED.N.Y. 1968).
87 Id. at 501.
88 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); see Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 100 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1194 (1969).
89
 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
88 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 20.
91 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
92 Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
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alternative to a class action only when all the members of the class are
represented by the various suits. Otherwise, a consolidated action would
represent only a part of the class. Thus consolidation is superior to the class
action when the class is adequately defined and completely represented in
individual suits. The individual suits could be consolidated for the designated
common issues and then separated to proceed as individual actions again.
By intervention, a party simply enters an action already in progress."
A large class could not effectively intervene without making the proceedings
unmanageable. Furthermore, intervention is a voluntary action. To be effec-
tive, the parties must be aware of their rights and be able to afford the costs
of litigation. Thus, if there were a large class or if the class consisted of small
claimants, intervention would be inappropriate. The class action would not
be superior to intervention only where the class is of manageable size, knows
of its rights and can afford litigation.
A test action is a case selected from numerous similar cases pending
before the court. 94 The test case proceeds to trial and determines the right
of recovery in the other actions, the other litigants having agreed to be bound
by the results of the test action. 95 A test action would be superior to the class
action only when all the members of the class have brought individual suits.
Class members unaware of their rights, or who have just not brought suit,
would be neither bound nor represented by a test action.
A final alternative lies in administrative remedies. An administrative
agency is especially helpful in very complicated actions. For example, the
individual claimants in a large antitrust case could await an action by the
Justice Department. If the defendant is found guilty, all civil plaintiffs may
use the judgment in their civil suits for damages as prima facie evidence of
liability." Thus class members could wait until the defendant's liability has
been determined and then bring individual actions for damages, rather than
bring a class action based on the existence of the antitrust violation as the
common issue. However, the Justice Department is not designed for such an
extensive policing purpose. Because of budgetary limitations and the lack of
manpower, this organization, like most administrative agencies, cannot fully
investigate or take action in every possible case.97 Only in a limited number
of cases would the agencies aid in obtaining relief.
An administrative agency could also supply relief. For example, if the
class of consumers wanted to sue for lower telephone rates, an appeal to the
Federal Communications Commission would be superior to a class action.
The Commission would have the expertise and the information to determine
whether the rates were excessive, and could order the utility to abate them.
Whether resort to the administrative agencies would be superior to a class
action would depend on the type of relief available from the agency and on
the attitude of the agency toward the problem of the class.
96 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
94 Black's Law Dictionary 1643 (4th ed. 1968).
95 Id.
96 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
'7 See Loevinger, Private Action—The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 Antitrust
Bull. 167, 168 (1958).
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A somewhat different alternative to the class action arose in Berley v.
Dreyfus & Co.98
 The plaintiff brought a class action against a broker for
the sale of unregistered securities. Since the broker had sent a letter to all
of his customers offering to refund their purchase price with interest without
release of any of their rights, the court held that this was a better method of
settling the controversy. The motion for a class action was dismissed and the
plaintiff was permitted to sue individually for punitive damages. 99
CONCLUSION
Revised Rule 23 greatly improves upon the former Rule. The three
effect-oriented (b) categories establish more realistic bases for the class
actions than did the old Rule, and provide relief through the class action
device over a broader range of instances.
The (b) (1) category permits a class action where separate suits by or
against individual members of the class create a clause (A) risk that incon-
sistent judgments will impose incompatible standards of conduct upon the
party opposing the class or a clause (B) risk that the judgments would ad-
versely affect the interests of unrepresented members. Under clause (A) the
possibility of separate actions must be present; under clause (B) it need not
be. Each clause supplies a practical test readily administered by the courts.
Where the party opposing the class has acted or failed to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class and where final injunctive or corres-
ponding declaratory relief is appropriate for the class, a (b) (2) class action
exists. Although (b) (2) was intended to permit class actions in the civil
rights area, the language is sufficiently broad to embrace other types of
class actions. Furthermore, the fulfillment of the (b)(2) requirements is easily
ascertained by the courts.
The (b) (3) category differs from the other two (b) categories in its
requirement that the court make explicit findings. It must find that common
questions of law or fact predominate over questions involving individual
members, and that a class action is superior in efficiency and fairness to any
other form of settlement. Here the court is guided in part by the four factors
enumerated in (b) (3) and by the purposes of that subsection. The language
of the subsection and the nature of the two mandatory findings indicate
that (b) (3) is to be a broad, catch-all category. The explicit purpose of
(b) (3) is to permit a class action where "economies of time, effort and
expense" will be achieved. But sympathy for the small claimant also seems
to have motivated the category. In fact, the language of (b) (3) allows class
actions for the small claimants where the former Rule failed to do so.
As with the other two (b) categories, application of (b) (3) appears
to be a relatively uncomplicated task for the courts. Although some disagree-
ment has arisen, the courts have found predominance of common questions
in antitrust cases and in cases of securities fraud. In the latter instance they
have fashioned the "common course of conduct" test to determine the pre-
98 43 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
99 Id. at 398-99.
555
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
dominance of common questions. The finding of the superiority of the class
action presents no insurmountable difficulty. It involves the weighing of the
efficiency and fairness of the class action against the same attributes of
other available means of resolution.
A reasonable application of the three (b) categories should provide class
actions wherever such actions will protect the class or the party opposing the
class. Moreover, the Rule seems to eliminate the problems of the former Rule.
However, the efficacy of the new Rule and its three categories remains to
be evaluated more conclusively in the light of coming litigation.
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